Πηγή: www.state.gov
ΟΥΑΣΙΓΚΤΟΝ. Οι ταυτότητες στην Ελλάδα είναι «εξαιρετικά ευάλωτες σε παραποίηση και αντικατάσταση» φωτογραφίας», ενώ δεν ενσωματώνουν τα «χαρακτηριστικά ασφάλειας, όπως ψηφοποιημένη ταυτότητα και βιομετρικά στοιχεία», επεσήμανε η έκθεση του Στέιτ Ντιπάρτμεντ για την τρομοκρατία σε παγκόσμιο επίπεδο το 2016.
Υπογράμμιζε δε την «πορώδη φύση» των ελληνικών συνόρων, που παραμένει «σοβαρή ανησυχία».
Ειδικότερα, στο ειδικό κεφάλαιο της έκθεσης για την Ελλάδα, τονίζεται μεν ότι η ελληνική κυβέρνηση παρέμεινε το 2016 ένας πρόθυμος εταίρος στις προσπάθειες αντιμετώπισης της τρομοκρατίας και ότι ανώτατα στελέχη της έδωσαν έμφαση στην καταπολέμησή της.
Ακόμη ότι υπήρξαν σποραδικές ενέργειες μικρής κλίμακας, κυρίως εκρήξεις αυτοσχέδιων εκρηκτικών μηχανικών που τοποθέτησαν εγχώριες τρομοκρατικές οργανώσεις, αναφέρεται, όμως ήταν ελαφρά λιγότερες απ’ ό,τι τα δύο προηγούμενα χρόνια.
Στην έκθεση συμπληρώνεται ότι η Ελλάδα είναι μέλος του διεθνούς συνασπισμού εναντίον του Ισλαμικού Κράτους και εφαρμόζει πλήρως τις Αποφάσεις 2178 και 2199 του Συμβουλίου Ασφαλείας και το καθεστώς κυρώσεων σε βάρος του ΙΚ που επέβαλε το ΣΑ του ΟΗΕ.
Σε κάθε περίπτωση όμως το θέμα των ταυτοτήτων και η αντικατάστασή τους, το οποίο έχει τεθεί επανειλημμένα από τις ΗΠΑ παραμένει και μπορεί να έχει επιπτώσεις και στο πρόγραμμα ESTA visa waiver.
Σε σχέση με τις ταυτότητες, η έκθεση επεσήμανε πως ότι για να μετριάσουν το πόσο ευάλωτες είναι, οι αστυνομικές αρχές θεσμοθέτησαν ένα σύστημα το 2015 για να διεξάγει ηλεκτρονικούς ελέγχους σε αρχεία του δημοσίου ώστε να επιβεβαιώσουν τα έγγραφα τα οποία υποβάλλονται για την εκδοσή τους. Αντίστοιχος έλεγχος γίνεται σε σχέση με την έκδοση διαβατηρίων.
Η κυβέρνηση, έχει περαιτέρω δεσμευθεί να διευθετήσει το θέμα με την έκδοση νέων βιομετρικών ταυτοτήτων.
Για τα σύνορα, η έκθεση, ανέφερε ότι η πορώδη φύση τους παραμένει σοβαρή ανησυχία, ειδικά καθώς η Ελλάδα συνέχισε να έχει δοκιμάζεται από την προσφυγική και μεταναστευτική κρίση. Εξι από τους δράστες των επιθέσεων σε Παρίσι και Βρυξέλλες εκ των υστέρων αναγνωρίστηκαν ότι πέρασαν από την Ελλάδα.
Η Ελλάδα βρέθηκε υπό έντονη πίεση από τις χώρες μέλη της ΕΕ, με ορισμένες από αυτές που ανήκουν στη ζώνη Σένγκεν να επαναφέρουν έλεγχο στα σύνορά τους, μέχρι η Ελλάδα να διορθώνει ελλείψεις στη διαχείριση των εξωτερικών της συνόρων, σύμφωνα πάντα με την έκθεση,
Για να βοηθήσει την διευθέτησει αυτών των προβλημάτων, τον Μάιο και τον Ιούνιο το υπουργείο Εσωτερικής Ασφάλειας (DHS) και οι υπηρεσίες του, παρείχαν μία σειρά από εκπαιδεύσεις για να ενισχύσουν τις προσπάθειες ασφάλειας των ελληνικών συνόρων.
Η Transportation Security Administration παρείχε εκπαίδευση για εγρήγορση σε σχέση με εσωτερική απειλή και ηCustoms Border Protection και η Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) παρείχαν εκπαίδευση για έλεγχο επιβατών σε περισσότερους από 100 υπαλλήλους αεροδρομίων, στελέχη αεροπορικών εταιριών και αστυνομικούς.
Η ICE επίσης παρείχε εκπαίδευση σε σχέση με προηγμένη ανάλυση παραποιημένων εγγράφων σε πάνω απο 25 αστυνομικούς, λιμενικούς και τελωνειακούς.
Αναλυτικά η έκθεση για την Ελλάδα και την Κύπρο (στα αγγλικά)
GREECE
Overview: In 2016, the Greek government remained a cooperative counterterrorism partner. Senior Greek government leaders have emphasized that counterterrorism is one of their top priorities. In 2016, Greece experienced intermittent small-scale attacks such as improvised explosive device detonations by domestic terrorist groups, although slightly fewer than in the past two years. Generally, these attacks did not appear aimed to inflict bodily harm, but rather sought to make a political statement. The MFA quickly condemned foreign acts of terrorism such as the Brussels attack in March 2016 and has strongly condemned the actions of ISIS. Greece is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and is implementing UN Security Council resolutions 2178, 2199, and the UN Security Council ISIL (Da’esh) and al-Qa’ida sanctions regime.
2016 Terrorist Incidents: Greece’s two largest cities, Athens and Thessaloniki, experienced a few small-scale attacks conducted primarily by domestic terrorist organizations, which targeted government officials as well as a European Embassy.
On October 11, a bomb was planted on the car of a Korydallos Prison guard parked outside his home overnight. The explosion destroyed the car, although nobody was injured in the blast. No one claimed responsibility for the attack.
On October 12, a bomb exploded on the sidewalk near the apartment building where Appeals Court Prosecutor Georgia Tsatani resides. The terrorist group Conspiracy of Nuclei Fire claimed responsibility on October 13 and stated that the Prosecutor was the target. Advance warning was given and police evacuated the area; there were no injuries.
On November 10, two individuals threw a grenade at the French Embassy, injuring a Hellenic Police officer guarding the embassy. A little-known group, the “Organization Revolutionary Self-Defense,” claimed responsibility for the attack four days later. Hellenic Police, however, are exploring whether various other domestic terrorist groups may have been involved.
On December 12, an individual provided advance warning that a bomb had been placed at the Ministry of Labor in downtown Athens. Hellenic Police conducted a controlled detonation of the device in the early hours of the morning. Nobody has claimed responsibility for planting the bomb and no one was injured.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Article 187A of the Greek penal code codifies the terrorism statute. In addition, Article 28 (1) of the Greek Constitution subjects Greek citizens to applicable international laws, to include those related to terrorism. Article 28 (2) and (3) subjects Greek citizens to applicable European Union (EU) Laws, including the EU law against terrorism. The Police Directorate for Countering Special Violent Crimes (DAEEV) is responsible for counterterrorism in Greece. DAEEV attracts highly motivated and educated young police officers. This unit has demonstrated a high capacity to collect information, but it lacks capacity to use the volume of data it collects and to share with other services within the Greek police and Coast Guard.
On October 12, a bomb exploded on the sidewalk near the apartment building where Appeals Court Prosecutor Georgia Tsatani resides. The terrorist group Conspiracy of Nuclei Fire claimed responsibility on October 13 and stated that the Prosecutor was the target. Advance warning was given and police evacuated the area; there were no injuries.
On November 10, two individuals threw a grenade at the French Embassy, injuring a Hellenic Police officer guarding the embassy. A little-known group, the “Organization Revolutionary Self-Defense,” claimed responsibility for the attack four days later. Hellenic Police, however, are exploring whether various other domestic terrorist groups may have been involved.
On December 12, an individual provided advance warning that a bomb had been placed at the Ministry of Labor in downtown Athens. Hellenic Police conducted a controlled detonation of the device in the early hours of the morning. Nobody has claimed responsibility for planting the bomb and no one was injured.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Article 187A of the Greek penal code codifies the terrorism statute. In addition, Article 28 (1) of the Greek Constitution subjects Greek citizens to applicable international laws, to include those related to terrorism. Article 28 (2) and (3) subjects Greek citizens to applicable European Union (EU) Laws, including the EU law against terrorism. The Police Directorate for Countering Special Violent Crimes (DAEEV) is responsible for counterterrorism in Greece. DAEEV attracts highly motivated and educated young police officers. This unit has demonstrated a high capacity to collect information, but it lacks capacity to use the volume of data it collects and to share with other services within the Greek police and Coast Guard.
Greece’s national ID card is extremely vulnerable to alteration and photo substitution, and it has not incorporated security features, such as a digitized photo and biometrics. To mitigate this vulnerability, police authorities instituted a system in 2015 for conducting electronic checks of civil registry databases to confirm documents submitted as part of the application for ID issuance and checks of national ID databases for passport issuance. The government has further committed to address this vulnerability through the introduction of a biometric national ID.
The porous nature of Greece’s borders remained of serious concern, particularly as Greece continued to be challenged by the refugee and migration crisis. Six of the attackers involved in the Paris and Brussels attacks were subsequently identified as having passed through Greece. Greece came under intense scrutiny from EU member states, with some Schengen members reinstating border controls until Greece corrects deficiencies in its external border management. To help address vulnerabilities, in May and June, DHS and its component agencies provided a series of trainings to bolster Greek border security efforts. The U.S. Transportation Security Administration provided Insider Threat awareness training and U.S. Customs Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) provided traveler screening trainings to more than 100 airport employees, airline officials, and police. ICE also provided training on advanced Fraudulent Document Analysis for investigations to more than 25 Hellenic Police, Hellenic Coast Guard, and Customs officials.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Greece is a member of the Financial Action Task Force, and its financial intelligence unit – the Hellenic Anti-Money Laundering and Anti‑Terrorist financing Commission (HAMLC) – is a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. The Foreign Ministry’s Sanctions Monitoring Unit is tasked with ensuring that Greece meets its commitments to enforce international sanctions, including terrorism-related sanctions. The HAMLC, which is essentially an autonomous institution, although nominally under the oversight of the Ministry of Finance, inspected more than 2,530 suspicious transactions through November 20, 2016, but did not report evidence of terrorist financing in Greece.
In Greece, terrorist assets remain frozen until the completion of judicial proceedings when a court decision is rendered. Non-profit organizations are not obliged to file suspicious transaction reports; however, all banks – through which these organizations conduct transactions – are legally obliged to report suspicious transactions of any kind, regardless of the type of entity (for‑ or not-for-profit), and the government may directly monitor such entities if necessary.
FBI trainers provided a terrorism finance training seminar in March 2016 for approximately 20 officers from the Hellenic Police, Hellenic Coast Guard, and Financial Intelligence Unit.
For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2017 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.
Countering Violent Extremism: Greek Foreign Minister Kotzias has steadily and publicly voiced support for countering ISIS and condemned its actions. Greece is sensitive to the dangers of radicalization to violence and engages regional partners on the matter. This summer the Hellenic Police through the Center for Security Studies, and with 75 percent EU funding support, organized training on radicalization to violence for police, prison wardens and guards, and customs officers and immigration officials. The training program involved a total of 130 officials from Alexandropoli, Athens, and Thessaloniki, and from the islands of Chios and Lesvos, which have seen the majority of arriving migrants and refugees over the last year.
International and Regional Cooperation: Greece engaged constructively on counterterrorism initiatives in international fora and regularly participated in regional information exchange and seminars through such bodies as the United Nations, the EU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Southeast European Law Enforcement Center for Combating Trans‑Border Crime, and the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Greece participated in international and regional trainings geared to bolster criminal justice efforts to prevent and respond to terrorism.
CYPRUS
Overview: The Republic of Cyprus collaborated closely with the United States, the European Union (EU), and other countries – bilaterally and multilaterally – in international counterterrorism efforts in 2016. Cyprus’ counterterrorism partnership with the United States included participation in a Department of State-funded Department of Justice regional program focused on countering Hizballah. The program strengthened the government’s understanding of Hizballah and stressed the importance of interagency cooperation in countering all types of terrorism.
Since 1974, Cyprus has been divided de facto into the Republic of Cyprus government‑controlled area, composed of the southern two-thirds of the island, and the northern third not under the effective control of the Republic of Cyprus, which is administered by the Turkish Cypriots. In 1983, the Turkish Cypriots declared the northern part to be the independent “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”). The United States does not recognize the “TRNC,” nor does any country other than Turkey. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) patrols the Buffer Zone, also called “the Green Line,” which separates the two sides, is largely open to civilian traffic, and remains a significant route for the illicit transit of people, narcotics, and other contraband.
The division of the island has impeded counterterrorism cooperation between the two communities and between the Republics of Cyprus and Turkey, which do not maintain diplomatic relations. Given the lack of international recognition, the Turkish Cypriots do not have the legal and institutional framework necessary to counter the financing of terrorism effectively. Within these current limitations, Turkish Cypriots have cooperated in pursuing specific counterterrorism objectives.
Cyprus is a partner in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and regularly participates in the Coalition’s Working Groups on Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Counter-ISIS Finance Group.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Republic of Cyprus enacted a National Law on Combating Terrorism in 2010 that incorporates EU Council Framework Decisions. Cypriot authorities continued to develop capabilities under the supervision of the National Counterterrorism Coordinator and a specialized counterterrorism squad in the Cypriot National Police’s (CNP) Emergency Response Unit.
In response to multiple terrorist attacks in Europe, Cyprus enhanced its security cooperation and law enforcement measures. These activities included increased patrols around critical infrastructure and soft targets including popular tourist resorts, cultural sites, and diplomatic facilities. They have also increased security measures and surveillance at border crossing points and along the “Green Line” and Cypriot coast. Cyprus has strengthened passport control at airports and seaports through improved information exchange with Europol and INTERPOL regarding lost and stolen passports and enhanced training for border security officers to identify potential foreign terrorist fighters.
Cyprus currently is reviewing its existing legislation to address the requirements set out in UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 2178. Cyprus is also preparing to implement the 2016 EU Directive on the use of Passenger Name Records.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: The Republic of Cyprus is a member of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Cyprus’s financial intelligence unit, the Unit for Combating Money Laundering (MOKAS), is a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units.
In April 2015, MOKAS started using “goAML,” a sophisticated IT system, designed to meet data collection, management, analytical, workflow, and statistical needs of FIUs. This new system enables supervised entities to submit suspicious transaction reports to MOKAS electronically, under the highest security standards. MOKAS has already reported a 25 percent increase in the number of reports filed since the inception of this system, crediting it with simplifying the submission process.
In 2016, Cypriot authorities continued conducting a national risk assessment on money laundering and terrorist financing, covering the entire anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) system, including charities. This document will build on a set of AML/CFT reforms, focusing on the financial sector transparency that Cyprus implemented in 2013-2016, in accordance with its IMF assistance program.
Cyprus has implemented the UN Security Council ISIL (Da’esh) and al-Qa’ida sanctions regime and informally tracked individuals and entities listed under U.S. executive orders (E.O.), including E.O. 13224. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs circulates updates of UN and EU sanctions lists to relevant authorities as well as the Cyprus Bar Association and the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Cyprus. Cyprus does not have legal powers in place to apply targeted financial sanctions pursuant to UNSCR 1373, however.
Cyprus enacted legislation in 2016 to designate national competent authorities for implementing the EU and UN sanctions regimes and criminalizing infringements (“The Implementation of the Provisions of UNSCRs or Decisions (Sanctions) and Decisions and Regulations of the Council of the European Union (Restrictive Measures) Law of 2016, L.58(I)/2016”). This law also enables the supervisory authorities of the financial and non-financial sector to issue directives to their regulated entities and take administrative measures in case of non-compliance. Cyprus did not identify or freeze any assets pursuant to relevant UNSCRs in 2016.
The Central Bank of Cyprus is the supervisory authority for the banking sector, including cooperative societies, electronic money institutions, and payment institutions. Cyprus does not have a significant unregulated informal banking and money transfer system. Predominantly due to low capacity for supervision of financial institutions and company formation, Cyprus remains a major hub for shell company activity.
For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2017 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.
Countering Violent Extremism: Cyprus has established a network of first-line officers in the CNP, Social Welfare Services, and Ministries of Justice, Education, and Interior, to exchange information and best practices on identifying radicalized behavior. The government has also established relationships with civil society organizations and municipal authorities to prevent radicalization to violence. Cyprus has continued its participation in the European Commission’s Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN), and prison staff participates in the RAN Prison Network of the EU.
International and Regional Cooperation: Members of the CNP’s Counterterrorism Office participate in the Working Group on Terrorism at the Council of the EU. Cyprus regularly participates in the Police Working Group on Terrorism, the “Dumas” Working Group, the European Expert Network on Terrorism, and the Europol European Counter Terrorism Center, as well as other meetings convened under Europol and INTERPOL. Cyprus has contributed to the Council of Europe’s efforts to establish and adopt the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on Combating Terrorism, which addresses foreign terrorist fighters within the framework of UNSCR 2178 (2014).
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